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The Amphibian Stand is an interesting and in many ways original book, 
written by a Swedish philosopher of art, Dr. Per Nilsson, a man in his late 
forties who is an associate professor at the Umeå Academy of Fine Arts.
In his book, he says that he regards his project as a meta-theory, as a 
clarification of the pragmatic conditions for the meaningfulness of art. 
He tries to unify themes from, on the one hand, Arthur Danto and, on the 
other, Jürgen Habermas, on the one hand Immanuel Kant, on the other 
the likes of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida. Art is partly a prob-
lem solving activity in the Habermasian sense, partly a world disclosing 
activity in the Heideggerian/Derridean sense. 
Nietzsche has a point when he underlines the fact that art is a part of 
life and that it has perspectivist aspects. Kant has a point when stressing 
that aesthetic judgement is not entirely beyond the realm of universal 
reason. Nietzsche takes a Dioynisian view of art, Kant an Apollonian 
one, and both views are necessary. Nietzsche focuses on the artist (the 
sender), Kant on the recipient, and both perspectives can be unified. 
Nietzsche’s focus on the artist makes art monological: One only listens 
to the monologue of the artist and forgets the possibility of dialogue 
between artist and viewer, forgets the necessity of interpretations per-
formed by the viewer. Kant’s idea of sensus communis points toward a 
dialogical conception of art. And Nilsson certainly draws on Kant’s idea 
of aesthetic judgement as not providing generalizable knowledge and 
being an informed judgement rather than any use of algorithm.
Nilsson maintains that art is a form of knowledge in its own right 
and art can be a kind of research based knowledge (p. 10). Art can be 
considered as providing examples of possible consequences of scientific 
philosophical or political theories for the lives of situated human beings. 
Further, the criticial potential of art can only be discussed in the form of 
examples. This means that the question of methodology, which artists 
use, or ought to use, in their research, will be left unanswered. To strive 
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for an articulation would be self-defeating (p. 11). However, Nilsson does 
not explain why this would be self-defeating. 
Now to Nilsson’s basic idea: Art is amphibian, i.e. it is like amphibian 
animals that live partly in the sea and partly on the shore, in a littoral 
landscape. It functions as a map of our littoral landscape, i.e. the ambiva-
lent part of the human world, the part where the concretely sensuous 
meets abstract and normative thought. 
Actually, sometimes Nilsson uses the term “artwork” in the sense of 
“visual artwork,” in other cases in a wider sense, as when he discusses 
a poem by T. S. Eliot and uses a musical piece as an example (p. 68). A 
clarification would be a good thing. 
 The amphibian nature of an artwork is shown in the fact that it is a 
fusion of discourse(s) and an object. He uses “object” in a wider sense of 
the word; it does not have to be a thing, it can be purely conceptual. 
Artworks actually are not things in any ordinary sense of the word. 
Therefore, it makes sense to say that they are partly the discourses that 
they produce, just as it makes sense to say that they only exist qua in-
terpretations. The meaning of the artwork is a common product of the 
object and the discourses. Part of the conditions for such discourses is 
the overcoming of such distinctions between artist and viewer, object 
and interpreter (p. 54). 
The basic reason why an artwork, by necessity, contains a moment of 
discursivity is that A is only an artwork under some interpretation, and 
interpretations only make sense in explicative discourses. We see here 
an attempt to fuse together some moments of Arthur Danto’s and Jürgen 
Habermas’ theories, Danto’s idea of the artwork as essentially a result 
of interpretation and Habermas’s contention that an interpretation re-
quires an explicative discourse. Habermas echoes the private language 
argument; nothing can count as an interpretation unless it is publically 
checkable and if its validity can be decided upon in an open and free de-
bate. In Nilsson’s (and Habermas’s) view, an aesthetic discourse is largely 
normative, in contrast to a scientific discourse, which is basically descrip-
tive. The aesthetic discourse, however, has other dimensions as well. An 
artwork puts forth various validity claims, say, to authenticity or the im-
portance of its moral message. These validity claims need to be tested 
and judged in discourses.
A musical composition is the sum of the musical piece itself and the 
actual or potential discourses it can generate. Notice that the object side 
and the discourse side are woven into each other. As several validity 
claims can be involved in the work, it can generate several explicative 
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discourses. In the discourses, arguments that originate in such aesthetic 
positions as expressivism, emotivism or cognitivism can be used in a dis-
course as expressing the individual perspectives of its participants (p. 68). 
And there is no such thing as the final word in an aesthetic discourse, 
the true interpretation; the world of aesthetic discourses is a world of 
fallibility. A good interpretation is an interpretation that helps us make 
better sense of a given object in a given context than a rival interpreta-
tion. Art is what the art world agrees to consider as art after engaging in 
a discourse. But this agreement is revisable. The same holds for science 
(p. 73–74). Like science, art is capable of producing knowledge but it is 
a non-scientific knowledge about man and society. This knowledge is, in 
contrast to scientific knowledge, not separable from the learning process 
itself. As I understand Nilsson, he thinks that the object of artistic knowl-
edge does not exist out there as independent of the theories about it, but 
it is partly constituted by art itself. Similarly, moral, normative knowl-
edge is partly about something that is constituted by moral norms, they 
do not exist in nature (here, Nilsson draws heavily on Habermas). This 
means that knowledge produced in art is contextual and perspectivistic, 
world disclosing. It does not provide us with well-tested nomological 
hypotheses, it rather provides us with points of view, fruitful ways of 
seeing things (this is my reconstruction of Nilsson’s arguments, put forth 
on page 77). Artistic or amphibian knowledge cannot be a set of justified 
true beliefs. Further, it cannot falsify general theories or ideas but can 
deconstruct them (p. 139–140). Yet again, Nilsson is a bit unclear: What 
does he mean by “falsifying ideas”? And by deconstruction does he mean 
the same as Derrida did?
Be that as it may, the artistic or amphibian knowledge is commonly in-
voked in cultural criticism. Nilsson expresses agreement with Bourriaud’s 
thesis that art is a practice in which theoretically informed knowledge 
is tested in various contexts (p. 78). Now, language has a visual and sen-
suous side, which we usually do not notice. One of the cognitive func-
tions of artworks is to help us notice this side. In amphibian knowledge 
production, the sensuous and verbal elements of language are brought 
together (p. 89). Not only does language have hidden visual elements, 
paintings have hidden verbal moments. And we obtain amphibian or ar-
tistic knowledge when we discover these moments. For instance, Mieke 
Bal has pointed out that a certain Rembrandt painting can be understood 
as “saying” “rape is murder.” I guess that this interpretation only makes 
sense in an explicative discourse and by no means can it be regarded as 
the absolutely correct one. 
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The knowledge of art is less about discovering an abstract human es-
sence and more about self-expression or even self-creation. We are plas-
tic creatures of language, and therefore artistic language can change who 
we are, not least thanks to art’s world disclosing potential  (this is again 
my reconstruction of Nilsson’s arguments, page 96, 103, and elsewhere). 
The question of who we are or want to be is more aesthetical than ethi-
cal, Nilsson says. The aesthetical moment is often hidden or disguised 
as an ethical one (p. 102). My question is: Was Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s decision 
to become a Western person an aesthetical one? As I see it, she took an 
ethical decision, be it a right or a wrong one. I cannot see the aesthetical 
moments in her decision. 
But this does not mean that Nilsson ignores the moral moment of art, 
far from that. Art is, in a sense, action; discourses are the products of 
communicative acts and acts are typically not morally neutral; they can 
be judged in the moral dimension (p. 118).
Now to Nilsson’s contention that artistic/amphibian knowledge is 
based on research. He says that such a research is a practice through 
which we apply a form of knowledge to an object in order to gain knowl-
edge (p. 143). He agrees with Paul Feyerabend that traditions and ratio-
nality cannot be separated, that there is a dialectical relation between 
them; Nilsson seems to think that art is based on a different tradition 
than science and therefore has different standards for research. He ar-
gues that each artwork is a tradition unto itself, and in this world of 
artistic/amphibian research, Feyerabendian anarchism is a good thing 
(whether it would a good thing in science too, Nilsson does not say). 
Artistic research is like qualitative research; it is not by chance that quali-
tative research often employs artistic means. Norman K. Denzin’s and 
Yvonna S. Lincoln’s characterization (a–f) of qualitative research fits ar-
tistic research admirably: (a) The observer is situated (Nilsson: In art 
the artist is too); (b) The interviews in qualitative research are visual-
izing aspects of the world (Nilsson: The artist certainly does that too!); 
(c) The world is transformed, not only observed in qualitative research 
(Nilsson: Art transfigures and discloses the world); (d) Nevertheless, one 
represents the world in qualitative research (Nilsson: Art does that too, 
by disclosing perspectives on the world); (e) Qualitative research inter-
prets its objects (Nilsson: Art does too); (f) Qualitative research deals 
with meaning (Nilsson: The same holds true for art). 
So, this book is quite original and inspiring. What is really original 
about it is first of all the powerful metaphors of the littoral and amphib-
ian; secondly, the connected idea of an artwork as being part object, 
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part discourse; thirdly, the contention that art is a form of qualitative 
research. 
But Nilsson should have started the book with an explanation of these 
metaphors. He should also have used more space to clarify the concept of 
discourse and should have situated himself vis-à-vis Habermas. And, as I 
have already hinted at, now and then he expresses himself in a somewhat 
unclear fashion. Sometimes, he forgets to develop his arguments, cf. what I 
said earlier about his statement on page 11 about a certain attempt at being 
self-defeating. On page 49 he says that human self-creation is limited by 
biology and social context, but he does not argue in favor of this conten-
tion. Further, it is bit strange to refer to the visual as Dionysian. Nietzsche 
referred to the visual arts as Apollonian, music Dionysian. And of course 
Nilsson knows this, and he is entitled to use these concepts in his own way, 
but he should have explained why he does not use them like Nietzsche did. 
He also tends to repeat himself needlessly, for instance, he says several 
times that the artwork is a combination of object and discourse. The book 
should have been polished a bit; it looks a bit like the second to last version 
before publication. I advice the author to develop his ideas, write articles, 
and submit them to leading journals in the field.
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